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ABSTRACT
Self-propagating gene drive technologies have a number of desirable characteristics that 
warrant their development for the control of insect pest and vector populations, such as the 
malaria-transmitting mosquitoes. Theoretically easy to deploy and self-sustaining, these tools 
may be used to generate cost-effective interventions that benefit society without obvious bias 
related to wealth, age or education. Their species-specific design offers the potential to reduce 
environmental risks and aim to be compatible and complementary with other control strategies, 
potentially expediting the elimination and eradication of malaria. A number of strategies have 
been proposed for gene-drive based control of the malaria mosquito and recent demonstrations 
have shown proof-of-principle in the laboratory. Though several technical, ethical and regulatory 
challenges remain, none appear insurmountable if research continues in a step-wise and open 
manner.
Genetic control of mosquitoes
Mosquitoes are considered to be the most dangerous ani-
mals on earth. Through the transmission of deadly patho-
gens, they are believed to cause more than 700,000 deaths 
each year and are considered a major underlying cause 
of poverty in developing countries. Although more than 
3000 mosquito species have been described, only a hand-
ful are able to transmit human disease. Species within the 
genera Aedes, Anopheles and Culex are responsible for the 
most deadly and debilitating mosquito-borne diseases 
including dengue fever, Zika, yellow fever, encephalitis 
and malaria. Malaria, exclusively transmitted by a limited 
group of Anopheles mosquitoes, is the most devastating 
of these diseases and is thought to cause 445,000 deaths 
each year, killing a child under the age of 5 every two 
minutes. Control measures based upon antiparasitic 
drugs, vaccines, bed-nets, insecticides and the destruc-
tion of vector habitats have contributed to a progressive 
decrease in vector-borne diseases to the extent that 
regional disease elimination has been achieved in sev-
eral countries [1]. Control based upon these strategies 
alone is unlikely to achieve global eradication because 
the scale of the problem far exceeds the capabilities of 
existing or planned infrastructure, even with substantially 
increased funding. Moreover, the spread of resistance to 
insecticides and drugs threatens to reduce the efficacy 
of front-line interventions such that even  maintaining 
the current levels of disease transmission is expected to 
cost significantly more in the coming years [2–4]. As a 
result, interest has increased for genetic control that aims 
to reduce the harmful impact of pest and vector popu-
lations through the dissemination of desirable traits by 
mating or inheritance. As applied to vector control, these 
traits can be designed to reduce the capacity of a vector to 
spread human disease or to reduce its capacity to repro-
duce, known respectively as population replacement and 
population suppression. Another important considera-
tion is the persistence of the modification in the target 
population to distinguish between self-limiting, where 
the modification tends to disappear, and self-sustaining 
genetic strategies in which the modification is designed 
to persist and even spread within the target population. 
Though self-limiting strategies such as the sterile insect 
technique (SIT) and release of insects carrying a dominant 
sterile (RIDL) have been used successfully for local control 
of insect pest and vector species, they require a contin-
uous mass release of insects that is simply not feasible 
across large geographic regions or in areas where vector 
and parasite populations are particularly high [5–9].
Genetic control of malaria
Over 15  years ago, a team at Imperial College  London 
lead by Professor Andrea Crisanti was able to modify the 
genome of the Anopheles mosquito for the first time and 
two years later its full genome sequence was made publicly 
available ushering in a new era in the fight against malaria 
[10,11]. Together, these tools facilitated the identification 
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generations. The modification that is spread through 
the population is therefore self-sustaining and can be 
designed to reduce the harmful impact of insect pest 
and vector populations (Figure 1).
Gene drives are ideally suited for vector control as the 
short generation time of insects allows them to spread 
to fixation very quickly even if released from a low initial 
frequency [6]. In theory, a gene drive could be engineered 
to reduce either the potential of an insect vector popula-
tion to transmit disease (replacement) or its potential to 
reproduce (suppression/elimination). Vector-borne dis-
eases may be completely eliminated if a sufficiently high 
proportion of the natural vector population is immunized, 
or if the number of insects is brought below the threshold 
required to sustain disease transmission (Figure 2).
Gene drive systems
Ever since, the potential applications to vector control 
were first highlighted, researchers have looked to nat-
urally occurring selfish genetic elements from which to 
draw inspiration. Among these: transposable elements, 
heritable microorganisms, genetic underdominance, 
Maternal Effect Dominant Embryonic Arrest (MEDEA), 
meiotic drives and the natural ‘genetic scissors’ homing 
endonucleases are discussed briefly here.
Transposable elements
The transposable element P was the first natural gene 
drive to be extensively studied. Discovered first as the 
cause of hybrid dysgenesis between certain laboratory 
and naturally isolated strains of Drosophila melanogaster, 
it was found to spread throughout natural populations 
of the fruit fly in the late twentieth Century. It has a very 
simple structure consisting of a transposase gene within 
of key genetic factors such as those involved in mosquito 
fertility, viability or vectorial capacity. As the molecular 
genetics underlying these traits were gradually uncov-
ered, novel strategies to disseminate them throughout 
wild insect populations were also developed. The problem, 
which has long been considered, stems from the realization 
that without the means to spread a genetic modification, 
it may be unfeasible to rear and release enough modified 
insects to alter a relevant fraction of the wild population. 
Nevertheless, engineered traits are not easily disseminated 
throughout natural populations because of the tendency 
for natural selection to remove them over time, and 
because many of these traits are specifically designed to 
incur a fitness cost that will prevent their spread.
Gene drive
In the 1940s and 1960s, three researchers postulated the 
first strategies to control insect pest and vector popula-
tions using a self-sustaining mechanism to spread a desir-
able modification. Alexander Sergeevich Serebrovsky 
at Moscow University and Chris Curtis at the University 
of Bristol realized that certain chromosomal transloca-
tions could spread through and eliminate a population 
if they cause heterozygous inferiority – a strategy that 
later became known as genetic underdominance [12,13]. 
Around the same time at Imperial College London, Bill 
Hamilton postulated that a genetically encoded sex-ratio 
distorter could extinguish a population if, for example, 
a generator of extreme male bias were linked to the 
Y-chromosome [14]. These strategies, and the many 
others that have since been proposed, are now collec-
tively known as gene drive, a phenomenon where one or 
more genetic elements bias their inheritance above and 
beyond what is predicted by Mendelian genetics there-
fore increasing their frequency within a population over 
Figure 1. Mendelian inheritance vs. gene drive inheritance. In mosquitoes, as for any other sexually reproducing organism, genetic 
elements in heterozygosis have a 50 percent chance of being inherited by the progeny and therefore its frequency remains constant 
in the population, or more likely, it is gradually lost if the transgene carries a cost (upper panel). a gene drive results in most or 
all progeny of heterozygotes receiving the driving genetic element, this allows the modification to spread rapidly throughout the 
population over a few generations (lower panel).
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short inverted repeat sequences that, together, allow it 
to duplicate itself throughout the genome. In doing so, 
the P element ensures that it is inherited by a dispro-
portionately high frequency of the progeny. The selfish 
nature of P led some researchers to propose the use of 
transposases to engineer vector populations as a form 
of genetic control [12]. Since then, several genetic ele-
ments have been identified with characteristics similar 
to the P [15].
Heritable microorganisms
There are a class of naturally occurring microbiota that 
are heritable and some of these, including the most nota-
bly bacteria of the Wolbachia genus, show a natural abil-
ity to spread through natural populations. The Wolbachia 
are transmitted from one individual to the other in such 
a way that the entire progeny of an infected female will 
be infected. Eggs deposited by infected females always 
produce viable progeny whether they are fertilized by 
sperm from infected or non-infected males. Conversely, 
non-infected females do not produce viable progeny 
when fertilized by sperm from infected males and there-
fore, non-infected progeny are progressively eliminated 
from the population [16].  Depending on the  specific 
release program, Wolbachia can be used to suppress a 
population, or to reduce its capacity to transmit human 
disease as a result of its fortuitous  ability to reduce arbo-
virus transmission. Wolbachia based control of Aedes 
mosquitoes have successfully entered field testing in 
Australia, where the infection has maintained a moderate 
spread at two release sites [17–19]. In theory, transpos-
ons and Wolbachia could be used to spread the genes 
of mosquitoes that alter their reproductive capacity or 
make them unable to transmit the malaria parasite, how-
ever neither system has found practical applications for 
malaria control thus far. Nevertheless, two recent reports 
have demonstrated that natural and modified bacteria 
with antiparasitic properties can spread throughout lab-
oratory populations of the mosquito [20,21].
Genetic underdominance
Underdominant genetic traits cause infertility or reduced 
fitness when they are in heterozygosity compared to 
their homozygotes counterparts, such that a popula-
tion will naturally select for homozygosity of which-
ever allele is initially more frequent [12,13]. Therefore, 
an underdominant element can invade a population if 
seeded above the critical threshold required for spread. 
Though genetic underdominance is found naturally in 
mutually incompatible translocations, it is also possi-
ble to engineer underdominance using reciprocal kill-
er-rescue, where the ‘killer’ gene codes for toxicity and 
the ‘rescue’ codes for protection from the toxic effect, or 
by inducing chromosomal rearrangements [22–25]. To 
date, proof-of-principle of underdominant population 
transformation systems have been shown in the fruit 
fly Drosophila melanogaster, suggesting that translo-
cation-based synthetic systems may be engineered for 
the local population replacement of other vector species 
[25,26].
Maternal effect dominant embryonic arrest 
(MEDEA)
Selfish genetic elements called Maternal Effect Dominant 
Embryonic Arrest (MEDEA) are able to bias their own 
inheritance by selectively killing non-drive offspring 
using a toxin-antidote rescue system. They were first 
discovered because of their spread throughout natu-
ral populations of the flour beetle Tribolium castaneum 
and the toxin-antidote system was eventually used 
to create the first synthetic drive system in the fruit 
fly [27–29]. Since then, a number of similar strategies 
have been proposed that vary in the arrangement and 
mechanism of killer-rescue components, as well as the 
release threshold predicted for these to drive population 
replacement or population suppression [30–33]. Most 
recently, the strategy has been developed for use in 
the crop pest Drosophila suzukii using highly regulated 
maternal expression of a toxic miRNA that targets the 
Figure 2. Population suppression versus population replacement. In both cases the modified insects are released at a low initial 
frequency and spread in the population over generations. the modification can be designed to interfere with the mosquito 
reproduction or viability, aiming to the eliminate or suppress the population to levels that do not support disease transmission (left 
panel). alternatively, the modification can be engineered to replace the vector population with insects unable to effectively transmit 
disease (right panel).
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Homing gene drives
Homing endonuclease genes (HEGs) are selfish genes 
that are found throughout microbial life. They increase 
their allele frequency by cleaving rare or unique DNA 
targets within the host cell and, taking advantage of 
the cellular DNA repair machinery, use the HEG+ allele 
as a template for the homology-directed repair (HDR). 
During this process, known as ‘homing’, the HEG- allele 
is converted to HEG+ allowing the homing endonucle-
ases to be transmitted at super-Mendelian rates. The 
‘homing’ is unidirectional as the recognition sequence, 
once modified to contain the HEG, can no longer be 
recognized or cleaved by the nuclease. As such, HEGs 
cause an irreversible conversion from heterozygosity to 
HEG homozygosity, and this results in their biased inher-
itance. Because the endonuclease has high specificity 
for a 20–30  bp sequence, they do not tend to cleave 
anywhere other than their genomic target [45–49]. This 
has inspired another ground-breaking approach for the 
genetic control of natural populations of pest vectors. 
Drawing upon the natural system used by HEGs, Burt 
suggested that if homing may be allowed to proceed 
in the germline of a heterozygote then a disproportion-
ately high fraction of its progeny will contain the ele-
ment. If, for example, the homing reaction causes full 
conversion in the germline, then a heterozygote would 
produce 100% modified progeny instead of the 50% pre-
dicted by Mendelian inheritance (Figure 4). Because of 
this bias, a driving endonuclease gene is self-sustaining 
in a population as heterozygotes spread the element at 
the detriment of unmodified wild-type chromosomes. 
Genetic loads sufficient to eradicate a pest population 
can be imposed if the HEG is designed to target a gene 
that is essential or required for female fertility (Figure 5). 
Moreover, a driving endonuclease could be linked to an 
antiparasitic effector that would spread with the driving 
endonuclease gene [6].
zygotically-required myd88 gene. The toxicity is res-
cued by a drive-encoded copy of the myd88 gene that 
is expressed in the zygote [34]. Mathematical models 
indicate that Medea elements carrying transgenes that 
cause female-specific lethality in response to specific 
environmental signals could be used to generate popu-
lation suppression [30].
Meiotic drive and sex distortion
Meiotic drive elements act by impairing the transmis-
sion of specific gametes during meiosis  by, for exam-
ple, selectively removing the gametes that do not carry 
the drive element. The generation of extreme male sex 
ratio distortion has been proposed as a powerful tool to 
suppress or eliminate pest populations, and the pres-
ence of naturally occurring sex distortion in Aedes and 
Culex has generated increasing interest in the approach 
[14,35–37]. In 2003, Burt proposed a strategy where an 
engineered Y-chromosome, the determinant of male-
ness in Anopheles mosquitoes, could favor its own inher-
itance such that it can propagate an extreme male bias 
throughout a natural mosquito population to cause its 
ultimate suppression through the progressive reduc-
tion of females [6]. In this system, the Y-chromosome 
is engineered to carry an endonuclease that selectively 
cuts multiple sites exclusively within the X-chromosome 
during male meiosis such that only Y-bearing sperm 
are able to fertilize eggs. In 2007, the naturally occur-
ring endonuclease I-PpoI was used to selectively target 
Anopheles X-inked ribosomal DNA (rDNA) repeats, and a 
few years later it was possible to generate extreme male 
bias by restricting its enzymatic activity to male meiosis 
[38–40]. The strategy has also been proven to work using 
a CRISPR-based nuclease that can be widely applicable 
to other insect species [41]. However, it has not yet been 
possible to link the sex distorter to the Y-chromosome as 
would be required to spread [14,42–44] (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Meiotic Y-drive. an endonuclease (blue block), placed onto the mosquito Y-chromosome, is expressed during male meiosis 
to cut a multicopy target sequence on the X-chromosome. the shredding of the X-chromosome favors the unaffected Y-carrying 
sperm and results in the production of a male-biased progeny.
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minimum requirements predicted for use in vector con-
trol [43]. Several groups then embarked upon a con-
certed effort to re-engineer naturally occurring HEGs to 
target mosquito genes [52–56].
In theory, any endonuclease with a sufficiently long 
recognition sequence could be repurposed to function 
as a gene drive [6]; programmable zinc-finger nucleases 
In 2011, research in the laboratories of Crisanti, Russell 
and Burt led to the first demonstration of homing-based 
gene drives by placing the naturally occurring I-SceI 
homing endonuclease gene within an artificially inserted 
target site in the genome of mosquitoes and flies [50,51]. 
Moderate levels of homing allowed transmission to be 
biased by up to 60% in these studies, surpassing the 
Figure 4. homing gene-drive. the heg (or talen, ZFn, CRIsPR) is inserted within the target gene and expressed under a germline-
specific promoter. the endonucleases can be designed to disrupt essential mosquito genes, genes required for reproduction or 
those involved with parasite development within the mosquito (grey block). alternatively, the heg can be linked to an antiparasitic 
effector. homology-directed repair (hdR) of the double-strand break generated by the endonuclease leads to copying and ‘homing’ 
of the HEG+ allele.
Figure 5. gene drive system targeting female reproduction. the confinement of homing to the germline leads to super-Mendelian 
inheritance of the homing construct (in blue) that reduce the number of fertile females by targeting a haplosufficient, somatic 
female-fertility genes (in gray).
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end-joining. Several studies have found that repair by 
non-homologous end joining (NHEJ) and microhomol-
ogy-mediated end-joining (MMEJ) generate high levels 
of resistance in the early embryo, where error-prone 
repair seems to dominate over homologous recom-
bination [63–65,72–74]. Nevertheless, if the target is 
required for viability or fertility then cleavage-resist-
ant mutants will only stop the drive from spreading if 
they also restore some or all of the original function. In 
a caged release of gene drive, these restorative resist-
ant alleles were quickly selected from the wider pool 
of diverse mutants generated by the nuclease [75]. 
Mathematical modelling predicts that none of the drive 
systems developed thus far would sustain an invasion 
into natural populations without further measures to 
mitigate resistance [65,76].
Strategies to limit target site resistance
Since drives based upon homing endonucleases were first 
postulated, Burt also suggested a number of strategies to 
mitigate against target site resistance [6]. These range from 
restricting the nuclease expression to defined germline 
tissues, to the careful analysis of target sites that could 
reduce the pool of potentially resistance mutants and the 
targeting of multiple sequences to increase tolerance to 
individual resistant target sequences (Figure 6 and Box 1).
Box 1
(a)  Combined release. Several gene drives can be 
programmed to target independent loci in the 
genome and, akin to combination drug therapy, 
a combined release would reduce the impact of 
resistance to any one of these drives [6]
(b)  Multiplexing. Individual gene drives can be mul-
tiplexed to target several sites in the genome so 
that there is redundancy in the sequence-spe-
cific recognition of target genes [61,77].
(c)  Novel endonucleases. Novel or engineered 
CRISPR endonucleases, such as dCas9-FokI and 
Cpf1, may show more tolerance of sequence var-
iation at the cut site so that nuclease-induced 
mutations are less likely to prevent secondary 
cleavage [78,79].
(d)  Rational target site selection. Target sites within 
essential genes can be selected on the basis that 
non-resistant null alleles are more frequently 
generated after repair by micro-homology medi-
ated end-joining [74].
(e)  Regulation of nuclease expression. Tightly reg-
ulated germline-specific promoters, modifica-
tions that reduce mRNA or protein stability, or 
synthetic regulatory circuits can be used to limit 
nuclease deposition into the embryo that may 
cause the majority of resistant mutations [65,73].
(ZFNs) and transcription activator-like effector nucleases 
(TALENs) had been developed as easy-to-engineer alter-
natives [6,57,58]. Though the modular nature of ZFNs 
and TALENs simplifies the engineering of endonucleases 
to target mosquito genes, it also makes them poorly 
suited to build gene drives because of their tendency 
to recombine during homing [59].
By fortunate coincidence, the engineering of TALENs 
was quickly followed by the development of bacterial 
adaptive immune system Clustered Regularly Interspaced 
Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) and CRISPR associ-
ated proteins (Cas) (CRISPR/Cas or CRISPR) that has since 
revolutionized the process of genome engineering [60]. 
The CRISPR system, as it is most commonly used today, 
is based upon an endonuclease, called Cas9, directed 
to its genomic target by a short guide RNA that can be 
easily modified to target almost any site in the genome. 
The potential to adapt CRISPR for use in gene drives was 
highlighted almost immediately, and several groups were 
quick to demonstrate CRISPR-based homing in yeast and 
fruit flies before gene drives built for population replace-
ment and population suppression were demonstrated in 
Anopheles stephensi and Anopheles gambiae respectively 
[61–65]. In contrast to previous gene drives built using 
HEGs, TALENs or ZFNs, CRISPR-based gene drives showed 
almost complete transmission bias in all demonstrations 
of the technology.
Resistance to driving endonuclease genes
As with any strategy aimed at reducing the vector or 
parasite population, gene drives are at risk of resistance 
developing that can lessen or reverse the beneficial 
impact. Both molecular and behavioral traits can account 
for resistance and these include epigenetic silencing, 
RNA interference, assortative mating, co-evolution of 
the vector and parasite and, perhaps most importantly, 
target site mutations that are resistant to cleavage [66–
68]. For drives designed to spread an effector, there is 
the additional risk that the effector is lost leaving the 
empty drive to continue spreading at the exclusion of 
the intact drive.
In the best-case scenario, the few generations 
required by some drives to spread from low frequency 
to near fixation may simply outpace the creation and 
selection of many resistant traits, such as those requiring 
several adaptations. Nevertheless, significant push-back 
should be anticipated in the form of nuclease-resist-
ant targets that block homing at little or no cost to the 
host [6,33,42,43,61,69,70]. Nuclease-resistant alleles 
may already be common in the wild, single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) are estimated to occur every 
2.2 bases on average in the genome of Anopheles gam-
biae, and most variants would be expected to block 
the homing reaction [71]. Even at sites with minimal 
natural variation, resistant alleles could be generated 
by the nuclease itself as a by-product of error-prone 
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gene because the close proximity of targets would slow 
the process of recombination necessary to bring resist-
ant sequences together on a single chromosome. Each 
drive could be further improved if there is redundancy 
in its target site recognition – however there must be a 
balance between increasing the tolerance of a nuclease 
to mutant targets and limiting promiscuous cleavage at 
genomic off-targets that resemble the target elsewhere 
in the genome. Natural homing endonuclease genes 
have evolved this type of tolerance in the 3rd base ‘wob-
ble’ positions that could otherwise confer resistance, 
however this nuanced recognition is not possible using 
CRISPR. In 2014, Esvelt suggested that CRISPR-based 
drives could achieve similar redundancy through the 
use of multiple gRNAs in a single drive, each targeted 
to different sites within the same gene [61]. This has the 
added benefit that partially resistant alleles are actively 
removed from the population because, as long as one or 
more targets remain cleavable, homing can convert the 
entire locus to a drive allele. Multiplexed strategies may 
suffer from additional toxicity due to increased on- or 
off-target DNA damage; this may as well be exacerbated 
by an increased dose of nuclease that could result from 
using several nuclease-expression cassettes. Moreover, 
these elements may be more prone to breakdown in the 
process in homing by recombining along the repeated 
elements such as the gRNA scaffold or promoter. 
Along similar rationale, alternative nucleases could 
also reduce resistant mutations if the site of nuclease 
recognition were separated from the site of cleavage. 
In this scenario, mutations at the cleavage site would 
be re-cleavable if they do not extend to the nuclease 
recognition site, and several nucleases may already 
be suitable for this including Cpf1 nucleases, dCas9-FokI 
fusions and TALENs [58,78,79].
The above strategies focus upon reducing the range 
of mutant sequences that would confer resistance, how-
ever there are several strategies to limit their generation 
(f )  New strategies. Several new strategies have been 
proposed that should slow the rise of resistance 
whilst altering wild populations including dai-
sy-chain, where a number of genetic elements 
are combined to drive each other while losing 
their linkage until they are unable to spread, 
and daisyfield drives, where multiple copies of 
a ‘booster’ element are introduced in repeti-
tive regions of the genome. Other approaches 
include combining homing-based drives with a 
killer-rescue system that can remove non-drive 
progeny and help preserve cargo [80,81].
By choosing targets that are highly conserved in nature, 
resistance should mainly arise from the target site mis-
repair and, presumably, the absence of natural variation 
at these sites would be indicative of strong sequence 
constraints. The degenerate nature of the genetic code 
means that, for most protein-coding genes, there will be 
an array of sequence variants that do not alter the final 
encoded protein but could easily escape recognition by 
the nuclease. There are, however, genes that depend 
upon the nucleic acid sequence for their functionality 
– for example non-coding RNA or the targets of tran-
scription factors. By targeting these sequences, it may 
be possible to substantially reduce the fraction of muta-
tions that are also restorative. Furthermore, the range 
of end-joining mutants generated by CRISPR-based 
drives seems to be biased towards deletions expected to 
occur as a result of microhomology-mediated end-join-
ing (MMEJ). The predictability of MMEJ mutations may 
allow target sites to be selected on the basis that, in the 
absence of homing, MMEJ is expected to generate out-
of-frame or otherwise non-functional mutants [75].
Another potentially remedy is the use of several gene 
drives that could be targeted to different sequences 
such that the likelihood of resistance occurring to all 
of them would be reduced. This would be especially 
effective if these sites are dispersed throughout a single 
Figure 6.  strategies to limit target site resistance. schematic representation of some of the alternatives proposed to reduce the 
chance of resistance to homing-gene drives. (a) alternative nucleases such as FokI-dCas9 fusion proteins retain the ability to cleave 
a sequence of dna proximal to the target sites. Cleavage-induced mutations or pre-existing polymorphisms at the cut site, and 
outside the target, do not prevent further cleavage and homing [78]. (b) target sites can be selected based on nucleotide sequence 
conservation or the likelihood that micro-homology mediated end-joining will generate null alleles. Mutations that may prevent 
cleavage are mostly null and get removed from population. (c) Multiple gRna-expression cassettes or nuclease able to process its 
own CRIsPR-Rna (crRna), such as Cpf1, can be used to target multiple sites within the target gene. Mutations that prevent cleavage 
must simultaneously occur at all target sites to inhibit homing. Mutation occurring in only some of the targets can be removed 
during the homing-process stimulated by the cleavage of the intact sites.
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gene drives necessarily spread by genetic inheritance. 
The extreme specificity with which synthetic endonu-
cleases can recognize and cleave a target sequence may 
allow homing-based drives to be designed to target 
sequences that are specific to a species, subspecies or 
possibly even local populations. Nevertheless, the speci-
ficity afforded by gRNAs is mutable and could, in theory, 
adapt to generate gene drives that can cleave closely 
related sequences in non-target populations within the 
target species.
To ensure gene drive research is carried out respon-
sibly, laboratory experiments should be designed to 
combine different elements of containment and con-
finement, many of which have been described in detail 
elsewhere [90,91]. First and foremost, all gene drive 
research should be carried out by trained professionals 
using robust physical barriers such as triple-nested con-
tainers within secure and restricted access rooms [92]. 
Additional layers of security should be included where 
possible such as molecular containment that ensures 
that only laboratory-contained populations are sus-
ceptible to the drive by, for example, separating driver 
components or targeting synthetic sequences that are 
not found in natural populations [50,93]. Where possible, 
researchers should strive for reproductive and ecologi-
cal confinement by using organisms that cannot breed 
with natural populations or by restricting experiments to 
geographical locations that are outside of the habitable 
range respectively.
Beyond addressing the technical limitations to improve 
efficacy, a careful monitoring in physically, environmen-
tally and biologically confined large enclosures will be 
essential before moving to the field. Large cage testing 
allows to: I) reproduce releases and performances of the 
gene drives in environmental conditions more similar to 
the natural, such as temperature, humidity and light cycle; 
II) stimulate natural mosquito behaviors, otherwise not 
stimulated in small cages studies, like assortative mating 
and male swarming; III) evaluate fitness and competitive-
ness of the genetically engineered strains in consecutive, 
defined or overlapping generations of a larger number 
of mosquitoes; IV) accurate validation of modelling pre-
dictions of gene drive dynamics; V) increase the statistical 
power to detect rare events such as resistance or off-tar-
get effects. Laboratory experiments should be carried out 
alongside field studies that interrogate the genetic com-
position of mosquito species at potential release sites to 
help understand genetic heterogeneity, distribution and 
gene flow prior to release [94,95]. This will serve to inform 
release strategies and post-release monitoring that must 
follow any release into the wild.
Reversal and recall of driving endonucleases
The risk of unforeseen consequences to the ecosys-
tem or spread outside of the intended area following 
in the first instance. Several studies have shown that 
nuclease deposition into the embryo results in high lev-
els of end-joining as opposed to homing that tends to 
be preferred in the post-embryonic germline, and tight 
temporal and spatial regulation of the nuclease could 
limit this activity [73,75].More complex drive systems 
such as daisy chain and daisy field drives may also limit 
the accumulation of resistant mutations because the 
system comprises several layers of nucleases that each 
target independent sites [80]. By coupling any of these 
drives with a poison-antidote system, individuals are 
killed if they inherit a resistant allele instead of the anti-
dote-containing drive [7].
Off-target mutagenesis
Homing-based gene drives have the potential to gen-
erate unintended and heritable off-target mutations 
that may accumulate and result in fitness costs that 
impairs their potential to spread. Moreover, these muta-
tions could be stably propagated by nuclease-induced 
gene conversion. Currently, we know very little about 
how frequently off-target mutations are generated by 
a gene drive and what the potential impact could be. 
The likelihood of generating an off-target mutation 
will mostly depend upon the activity, specificity, dose 
and spatio-temporal regulation of the nuclease, the 
sequence of its target and flanking region, the presence 
and frequency of genomic sequences resembling the 
target, and the accessibility of these sites to the nucle-
ase and DNA repair machinery. Fortunately there are a 
number of systems that could be used to investigate 
off-target mutagenesis across the entire genome, most 
notably the in vivo assays Di-Genome Seq and GUIDE-
SEQ, and the in vitro assay CIRLCE-SEQ [82–84]. Future 
designs for gene drive will undoubtedly include alterna-
tives to Streptococcus pyogenes Cas9 that show improved 
on-target specificity such as natural or engineered high 
fidelity variants, Cpf1 nucleases shown to generate fewer 
off-target mutations or nickase/dimerising nucleases 
that require the cooperative binding at two independ-
ent sites and may be able to initiate the homing reaction 
[78,85–89].
Confinement, containment and scaling-up
Gene drive experiments must be safeguarded to mini-
mize the risk of accidental release and spread into wild 
populations using strategies for confinement and con-
tainment that provide biological and physical barriers 
respectively [90].
To some extent, gene drives provide their own level 
of confinement. Gene drives are naturally confined to 
a particular species or subset of closely related species 
because most species are ipso facto reproductively iso-
lated and, with the exception of heritable organisms, 
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to an individual gene drive product rather than forcing 
a precipitate judgement on the use of gene drives that 
may prematurely stifle research.
Gene drives are capable of disseminating a genetic 
modification throughout an entire population or spe-
cies within a time-frame that is unprecedented in his-
tory. As such, their development and potential use raises 
ethical considerations. Once a drive is released, there is 
currently no practical strategy to limit its geographical 
spread or to recall it and they may intentionally or unin-
tentionally alter the natural ecosystem. In some cases, 
the successful use of gene drive may reduce the harm-
ful impact that extensive vector and pest control cam-
paigns may have on the ecosystem. For example, gene 
drives being developed for malaria control have the 
potential to target the few species that transmit malaria 
without affecting more than 3000 mosquito species that 
do not transmit human diseases. The expectation being 
that the species-specificity afforded by gene drive-
based vector control should reduce dependency on 
mass spraying of insecticides or other broad-spectrum 
interventions. The decision to use gene drive technol-
ogies must therefore seek broad consensus from the 
nations that may be affected, and these decisions must 
be based upon rigorous evidence. Moreover, informed 
consent must extend beyond governments and regu-
lators to include local communities who will potentially 
benefit from its use. A successful deployment program 
requires an extensive and scrupulous public engage-
ment to communicate the key concepts and potential 
risks, and this must take place well-before any planned 
release of a drive.
Concluding remarks
Gene drives-based strategies have a number of advan-
tages that make them particularly suited for malaria 
control, most notably their self-sustaining nature. For 
instance, these approaches can offer a solution for 
malarial zones that are difficult to reach with conven-
tional interventions as they do not require continuous or 
mass releases. This would also negate the requirement 
for substantial infrastructure that may be unfeasible in 
the vast rural areas of Africa where the burden of malaria 
is most severe. Because gene drives spread by mating 
and rely upon highly specific target site recognition, the 
technology can potentially be restricted to single spe-
cies or perhaps even local populations. Together, these 
features depict this technology as the most targeted 
and cost-effective intervention currently under devel-
opment with the potential to benefit entire commu-
nities irrespective of their socio-economic conditions. 
Nevertheless, gene drives should not be seen as a silver 
bullet but rather, a complementary intervention that can 
be used alongside other malaria control strategies such 
as bed-nets, antimalarial drugs and vaccines. Target site 
intentional or unintentional release has pushed many to 
consider strategies to slow, reverse or completely recall 
gene drives. For suppressive drives that cause sterility or 
inviability in a population, there will be strong selection 
for target-site resistance that cause the drive to be lost 
[6,68,76]. Current designs for gene drive aim to prevent 
this type of resistance from occurring naturally, therefore, 
insects could be engineered to carry synthetic resistance 
and released as a countermeasure. If the drive population 
is geographically isolated, the release of resistant insects 
could be planned to create a buffer zone that protects 
against further spread as the drive population is eventu-
ally extinguished [6,42]. A resistant buffer zone could also 
prevent further spread of a replacement drive. However, 
because replacement drives do not confer major fitness 
costs, resistance would not replace the drive where it 
already exists.
Strategies have been proposed to speed up the pro-
cess and include several designs for ‘reversal drives’. 
‘Immunizing reversal drives’ can spread on their own 
and inactivate the first drive in the process, however 
these will also pose their own risk [61,93,96]. Potentially 
safer alternatives have been proposed that do not spread 
or spread only in the presence of the original drive and 
include split-drive type elements such as CATCHA (Cas9-
triggered chain ablation), ERACR (elements for revers-
ing the autocatalytic chain reaction), CHACR (constructs 
hitchhiking on the autocatalytic chain reaction) and 
e-CHACR [97,98]. Depending upon the specific parame-
ters of the drive and countermeasure, modelling predicts 
that successful drive removal will depend upon the tim-
ing and number of released insects and can sometimes 
result in stable equilibria or oscillatory dynamics in which 
the drive is never completely removed [96].
Regulation, ethical challenges and public 
acceptance
Gene drives pose a unique challenge for regulators 
because they have great potential to alter natural 
populations in the absence of continued human inter-
vention and without a comparator technology from 
which precedent can be drawn. As it stands, regula-
tion for the technology is not in place and so research 
has undergone a degree of self-governance led by the 
scientific community, research institutes and funders 
– who have advocated strict containment and con-
finement [61,65,90,92,99]. Following several important 
proof-of-principle experiments, the scientific community 
has called for clarity as to how gene drive research should 
be regulated [99]. In response, the National Academy 
of Sciences has published a report containing clear 
guidelines for safe and ethical research that encourages 
self-governance alongside government regulation that 
will evaluate gene drives on a case-by-case basis [91]. In 
this way, prudent regulatory decisions can be made on 
the basis of efficacy, safety and ethical concerns related 
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To conclude, gene drives may represent a pow-
erful tool to reduce infectious diseases and their 
related economic and ecological burden worldwide. 
Enormous progress has been made over the last dec-
ades and more will be required to overcome the chal-
lenges still lying ahead. Eventual decisions on their 
use will require evaluation on a case-by-case basis 
that balances the ethical and ecological implications 
with the potential benefits in agreement with the 
communities and the countries that are affected by 
the disease.
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